An ‘Exit Strategy’ Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons Learned From the British ‘Emergency’ in South Arabia, 1963–67
by Combat Studies Institute Press, Art Of War Scholars Program
This study explores intelligence lessons from the British “Emergency” in South Arabia, 1963–67. Centered on the question of whether an exit strategy can substitute for victory, it offers a focused historical examination for readers interested in military affairs, intelligence, and British involvement in South Arabia.
About This Book
This study examines the British “Emergency” in South Arabia from 1963 to 1967.
It focuses on intelligence lessons identified through that historical experience.
The title frames the discussion around the distinction between an exit strategy and a winning strategy.
Published by Combat Studies Institute Press and associated with the Art of War Scholars Program, the work is suited to readers of military history and intelligence studies.
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