Repeated Games (Econometric Society Monographs)
by Professor Jean-François Mertens, Professor Sylvain Sorin, Professor Shmuel Zamir
Repeated Games (Econometric Society Monographs) by Professors Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, and Shmuel Zamir examines the principles of dynamic games. It provides a thorough treatment of repeated strategic interactions, essential for economic analysis and theoretical research in game theory.
About This Book
Repeated Games is a key volume in the Econometric Society Monographs series, authored by leading experts in game theory. It delves into the theoretical foundations of repeated interactions in strategic settings.
The book covers core concepts such as folk theorems and equilibrium analysis in infinite and finite horizon games. It builds on established frameworks to address complex decision-making processes.
Designed for advanced readers, it serves as a reference for understanding how repeated play influences outcomes in economic models. The rigorous approach ensures clarity in mathematical expositions.
This work contributes to the broader field of econometrics by linking game theory to empirical applications. It remains a foundational text for scholars exploring dynamic systems.
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